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Drug Induced Insanity and Unconsciousness-
A Clarification of California Law
In People v. Kelly,' defendant Valerie Dawn Kelly appealed from
a lower court conviction on the charge of assault with a deadly
weapon and by means of force likely to produce great bodily in-
jury.2 The appeal produced an excellently reasoned clearly pre-
sented opinion by the California Supreme Court providing much
needed clarification of California law in the areas of unconscious-
ness and drug induced insanity and settled and/or permanent in-
sanity as defenses to criminal charges. The case is virtually an
encyclopedia of California law on the subjects mentioned above.
Defendant Kelly had been on drugs since she was fifteen years
old. In the fall of 1970, at age eighteen, she began using mescaline
and LSD, using them copiously up to December sixth. On that
day she was picked up by the police while she was under the in-
fluence of drugs. While still in that state, she was turned over
to her parents who drove her to her apartment where she spent
,the night.
The next day, at her request, the defendant was taken to her
parents' home by her mother. The latter later testified that de-
fendant was acting strangely at that time.3 She made defendant
lie down and went into the kitchen to make breakfast for her.
While she was doing this, defendant came into the kitchen and
stabbed her mother with some kitchen knives while the latter's
back was turned. Defendant was arrested, charged, and convicted
of the charge, as stated above, over her plea of not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity.
The lower court found that defendant was psychotic before and
after the attack on her mother and was not capable of understand-
ing that her act was wrong, but that her insanity was not a defense
because, said the court, it "was not of a settled and permanent
1. 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973).
2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 245(a) (West 1970).
3. People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 568, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr.
171, 173 (1973).
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nature, and, in addition, was produced by the voluntary ingestion
of hallucinating drugs."
The issues raised by the appeal and encompassed in the Court's
opinion were the following:
(1) The status, under the law, of the defense of unconsciousness
in the circumstances.
(2) The status, under California law, of the defense of drug
or other intoxication induced insanity and, more particularly, of
the defense of settled but not permanent insanity.
The second issue is of particular significance because the lower
court did find the defendant insane at the time of the attack, and
also before and after the attack, but it still rejected the defense
of insanity because the insanity was not settled and permanent
(emphasis added).4
The lower court's holding is not without precedent in California
case law with regard to its settled and permanent requirement in
the defense of intoxication induced insanity. The defendant's con-
tention that unconsciousness is a complete defense to a criminal
charge is also not without precedent in California case law. It
is the clear resolution of these two questions that makes the
Court's opinion particularly noteworthy.
Penal Code section 26, subdivision 5, says, "All persons are ca-
pable of committing crimes except those belonging to the follow-
ing classes: . . .Five. Persons who committed the act charged
without being conscious therof." However, section 22 excludes
voluntary intoxication as a defense to a crime. What happens,
then, if a crime is committed by a person while unconscious, the
unconsciousness having been caused by voluntary intoxication?
Citing its prior holdings in People v. Baker,5 People v. Conley,"
and People v. Graham,7 the Court said that unconsciousness caused
4. Id., n. 11. The lower court, having found defendant insane at the
time of the attack, nevertheless says, "[D]espite those facts, I hold that the
law does not admit of a defense to the crime charged by reason of legal
insanity, because the schizophrenia is not of a settled, permanent nature
and was produced in the first place by the ingestion of hallucinating drugs
and other drugs ... "
5. 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954).
6. 64 Cal. 2d 319, 323, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
7. 71 Cal. 2d 303, 316, 455 P.2d 153, 78 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1969).
by voluntary intoxication is not a complete defense to a criminal
charge. Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication goes
only to the question of intent and can have the effect of negating
specific intent. Therefore, if the crime charged is one of general
intent, the defense of unconciousness brought about by voluntary
intoxication is ineffectual. The fact that this may not have clearly
been the law previously is now unimportant. It is clearly the law
now. This Court has seen to that.
The next question has elements similar to those in the question
raised above. Again, Penal Code section 26, subdivision 3, this
time, provides that insanity is a complete defense to a criminal
charge. As pointed out above, however, section 22 excludes volun-
tary intoxication as a defense to a criminal charge. The parallel
question then is, what happens if a crime is committed by a person
while insane, the insanity having been caused by voluntary intoxi-
cation? This would seem to be a question so much like the one
involving unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication that its
answer should be predicated on the answer given by the Court
to the first question.
Obviously, the first question was resolved on the basis of bal-
ancing the two key factors involved, i.e., the policy concerning un-
consciousness, on the one hand, versus the policy concerning vol-
untary intoxication, on the other. In the Court's view, the second
policy factor more than counterbalanced the first. Viewed from
the vantage point of a weighing of computing policies, it is possible
to envision that the Court's resolution of the second question could
go either way without being in conflict with its resolution of the
first question.
A clue to the Court's direction appears from its reference to its
opinion in People v. Nash.8 It reiterates its position in that case
when it makes the rather strong statement, "It is fundamental to
our system of jurisprudence that a person cannot be convicted for
acts performed while insane." Nowhere does the Court ever say
that the defense of unconsciousness is "fundamental" to our system
of jurisprudence.
Historical precedents help to explain the difference in weight
accorded the two defenses. The test for insanity has sensational
implications rooted in the so called M'Naughten rule set out in
8. 52 Cal. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 416 (1959).
9. People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 574, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr.
171, 177 (1973).
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1843.10 Though modified in California," it still retains the essen-
tial quality of the rule as -originally formulated. 12 Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, insanity has acquired an almost sacrosanct quality
as a defense to a criminal charge. Unconsciousness has not.
Endorsing this premise, the Court almost gets to the point of
maintaining that, no matter what its origin, insanity is insanity
and is, therefore, a complete defense against a criminal charge.13
Consequently, even insanity induced by voluntary intoxication is
a complete defense to a criminal charge; unconsciousness induced
in the same way is not.
Having dispensed with the question of drug induced insanity,
the Court then tackled the question of whether such insanity must
be "settled," and if so whether it must be settled and permanent.
The resolution of this question was necessitated by the fact that
the trial court was confused on the question. That court held that
the defense of drug induced insanity was not available to the de-
fendant because the insanity was not settled and permanent. 14
The Court, to begin with, requires that the insanity must be
what it calls, "settled insanity."' 5 Basically, settled insanity is that
10. Daniel M'Naughtens Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (h.S. 1845).
11. See People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr.
271 (1964).
12. The original M'Naughten rule states:
"To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know it was
wrong."
In People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 801, 394 P.2d 959, 962, 40 Cal. Rptr.
271, 274 (1964), the rule was stated as follows:
"The test of sanity is this: First, did the defendant have suffi-
cient mental capacity to know and understand what he was doing,
and second, did he know and understand that it Was wrong and a
violation of the rights of another?"
13. In People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 575, 516 P.2d 875, 882, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 171, 178 (1973), the Court says, ". . . we have repeatedly held that
'when insanity is the result of long continued intoxication, it affects respon-
sibility in the same way as insanity which has been produced by any other
cause.' (People v. Griggs (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 621, 625. ..)"
Also, "Policy considerations support this distinction in treatment between
voluntary intoxication resulting in unconsciousness and voluntary intoxica-
tion which causes insanity."
14. See supra note 4.
15. People v. Kelley, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 576, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171,
178, (1973).
insanity produced by long-continued intoxication as opposed to
that temporary mental condition resulting from recent use of the
intoxicant. 16 Essentially, the difference between settled insanity
and temporary mental impairment is a function of how long after
the intoxicant, itself, leaves the body its effects remain. If its ef-
fects disappear when the intoxicant leaves the body or shortly
thereafter, the impairment of mental function may be deemed a
temporary mental condition. If the effects remain for a consider-
able period and do not wear off quickly, so to speak, the condition
is a settled one and qualifies as legal insanity.
The Court firmly and categorically rejected the notion that, to
qualify as a defense against a criminal charge, the insanity has
to be permanent as well as settled. If the insanity is found to
be settled, it is immaterial whether it is permanent or not. 17 The
Court pointed out that temporary insanity, as a defense to a crime,
has long been recognized as the law in California. 8 As a matter
of fact temporary insanity is as fully recognized as permanent in-
sanity as a defense to a crime."9 To suddenly impose the require-
ment of permanence would be to violate that long-standing rule.
In summation, the Supreme Court has clearly established what
the law is in California with regard to the issues of unconscious-
ness caused by voluntary intoxication, insanity produced by vol-
untary intoxication, and the quality of insanity necessary to qual-
ify as a defense to a criminal charge. That law is -as follows:
(1) Unconsciousness induced by voluntary intoxication, whether
by alochol, drugs, or other intoxicants, is not ,a defense to a general
intent crime. It may be a defense to a specific intent crime, but
it would go only to negativing the intent.
(2) Insanity induced by intoxication, whether by alcohol, drugs,
or other intoxicants, is a defense to a criminal charge. This is
so regardless of whether the insanity so induced is permanent or
not, providing only that the insanity so induced is settled and not
merely a temporary mental condition produced by recent use of
intoxicants.
That this is the law in California is further emphasized by the
fact that there were no dissenting opinions in the case.
As a by-product of this well reasoned and written opinion, there
appears a concurring opinion by Justice Mosk. This concurring
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. People v. Ford, 138 Cal. 140, 70 P. 1075 (1902).
19. Id.
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opinion, lending its voice to many others, attacks the M'Naughten
test for insanity and importunes the Court to adopt, instead, the
American Law Institute Model Penal Code test.20 That opinion
says that the M'Naughten test, to begin with, was judicially legis-
lated in California. Hence it can be replaced by the Model Penal
Code test, judicially. At the very least, suggests Mosk, the Court
should have invited the Legislature to adopt a substitute for
M'Naughten and, in the meantime, directed trial courts to employ
the ALI standard.
With the disaffection M'Naughten has so widely generated, it
would not be surprising to see it superseded by a standard closer
to the one proposed by ALL.
JEROME BLEIWEIS
20. ALI Model Penal Code § 4.01:
"(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in his article, the terms 'mental disease or defect'
do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated crim-
inal or otherwise anti-social conduct."

